Testing the Motor Simulation Account of Source Errors for Actions in Recall by Lange, N et al.
  
Date of acceptance: 13.09.2017, Date of publication: 28.09.2017 
Note: this is not the document of record: the final version is available at: 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01686 
 
Testing the motor simulation account of source errors for actions in 
recall 
Nicholas Lange1*, Timothy J. Hollins1, Patric Bach1 1 
1School of Psychology, Plymouth University, Plymouth, United Kingdom 2 
* Correspondence:  3 
Corresponding Author 4 
nick.lange@plymouth.ac.uk 5 
Keywords: recall, action memory, enactment, source memory, source monitoring. 6 
Abstract 7 
Observing someone else perform an action can lead to false memories of self-performance - the 8 
observation inflation effect. One explanation is that action simulation via mirror neuron activation 9 
during action observation is responsible for observation inflation by enriching memories of observed 10 
actions with motor representations. In three experiments we investigated this account of source 11 
memory failures, using a novel paradigm that minimized influences of verbalization and prior object 12 
knowledge. Participants worked in pairs to take turns acting out geometric shapes and letters. The 13 
next day, participants recalled either actions they had performed or those they had observed. 14 
Experiment 1 showed that participants falsely retrieved observed actions as self-performed, but also 15 
retrieved self-performed actions as observed. Experiment 2 showed that preventing participants from 16 
encoding observed actions motorically by taxing their motor system with a concurrent motor task did 17 
not lead to the predicted decrease in false claims of self-performance. Indeed, Experiment 3 showed 18 
that this was the case even if participants were asked to carefully monitor their recall. Because our 19 
data provide no evidence for a motor activation account, we also discussed our results in light of a 20 
source monitoring account. 21 
1 Introduction 22 
Many domestic arguments concern responsibility for actions, such as who last washed up or who left 23 
a coffee stain. Lindner, Echterhoff, Davidson, and Brand (2010) discussed a specific case of memory 24 
confusion for actions: the observation inflation effect. In a series of experiments, they reported that 25 
participants consistently claimed actions as self-performed when they had merely observed someone 26 
else perform those actions. Lindner et al. (2010) argued that observation inflation may emerge from 27 
motor simulation during action observation. Accordingly, observing an action engages some of the 28 
same neuronal populations as physically executing it (i.e. “mirror neurons”, Oosterhof, Tipper, & 29 
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Downing, 2013; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger & Prinz, 2000; Bach, 30 
Peatfield & Tipper, 2007; Bach, Bayliss & Tipper, 2011). While the specific function of mirror 31 
activation is not clear (Csibra, 1993; Hickok, 2009; Pfeifer, Iacoboni, Mazziotta, & Dapretto, 2008; 32 
Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2008; Bach, Nicholson & Hudson, 2014), it is normally assumed that 33 
observing an action generates an internal replica of the same action, as if it had been self-performed 34 
(Grezes & Decety, 2001; Jeannerod, 2001). Appropriation of observed actions therefore arises 35 
because the memory of somebody else’s action not only contains a visual representation of what was 36 
observed, but also a motor and proprioceptive representation similar to the memory one has of one’s 37 
own actions (Lindner et al., 2010).  38 
Yet, confusion over the source of memories extends beyond memory for actions. Imagination 39 
inflation (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996) is the increased belief in the occurrence of a 40 
merely imagined autobiographical event, such as a medical procedure in childhood (e.g. Mazzoni & 41 
Memon, 2003). People also confuse the source of two externally experienced events, such as whether 42 
they heard about a news story in the paper or on television (Johnson et al., 1993). Most relevant to 43 
the observation inflation effect, people have a tendency to claim others’ ideas as their own, an effect 44 
labelled unconscious plagiarism or cryptomnesia (Brown & Murphy, 1989; see Perfect & Stark, 45 
2008, for a review). In the prototypical study, participants take turns to generate solutions to a 46 
problem. These range from simple verbal fluency tasks (e.g. Brown & Halliday, 1991; Brown & 47 
Murphy, 1989) and creativity tasks such as alternate uses for a brick (e.g. Stark, Perfect, & Newstead, 48 
2005; Stark & Perfect, 2006, 2007), to real world problems such as ways of reducing childhood 49 
obesity (Perfect, Field, & Jones, 2009). When participants are asked to recall their own solutions, 50 
they commonly incorporate solutions generated by their partners, thereby claiming them as their own.  51 
The unconscious plagiarism effect is in many ways analogous to the observation inflation effect, and 52 
has been typically explained using the source monitoring framework. Under this account, the source 53 
of an item – from whom it originated – is not encoded explicitly alongside an item but inferred at 54 
retrieval using qualitative features encoded alongside the item, such as cognitive, affective and 55 
perceptual information. Source monitoring failures, such as participants falsely claiming a partner-56 
generated idea as their own, occur because participants did not sufficiently encode those features, are 57 
not evaluating them at retrieval, or because features do not clearly distinguish the two sources 58 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi and Lindsay, 1993). 59 
The source monitoring framework can not only account for the unconscious plagiarism error 60 
described above, but also predicts that the reverse memory error would occur as well. Indeed, recent 61 
work has shown that people do not only "steal" their partner’s ideas, but also "donate" their own 62 
ideas. In Hollins, Lange, Dennis and Berry (2016), participants alternated generating solutions to 63 
verbal fluency problems. Subsequently, when asked to recall their own ideas, participants showed the 64 
well-known unconscious plagiarism effect and included solutions generated by their partner. 65 
However, they also produced the opposite error: when asked to recall their partner’s ideas, they 66 
mistakenly reported their own ideas. This occurred at about twice the rate that they reported their 67 
partner’s ideas in the recall own task (see also Hollins, Lange, Dennis & Longmore, 2016). 68 
Unconscious plagiarism may therefore reflect a more general confusion about the source of memory 69 
that occurs when people seek to recall from one source whilst excluding competing sources, in line 70 
with the source monitoring framework. This raises the question whether actions are confused in the 71 
same way, and if invoking motor system activation is necessary to explain the observation inflation 72 
effect. 73 
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Thus, the current study tested the claim that motoric encoding of observed actions via motor system 74 
activation is responsible for false memories of self-performance (the observation inflation effect).  75 
Before we can test the motor activation claim, we need to establish if the observation inflation effect 76 
generalizes beyond the paradigm used by Lindner et al. (2010). Lindner et al.’s paradigm is a 77 
variation of the misinformation paradigm (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989) that has previously been used to 78 
investigate, for example, the imagination inflation effect (Goff & Roediger, 1998). It consists of three 79 
phases. In a first encoding phase, participants are shown action phrases such as “Lift the pen” on a 80 
screen. Participants are instructed to read all action phrases and enact a subset using the provided 81 
object. In a second encoding phase, some of the previously presented action phrases are presented a 82 
second time. Participants in the ‘observation’ condition now watch a video of an actor performing the 83 
action phrases they have either read or performed themselves in the first encoding phase. Participants 84 
in the ‘re-read’ condition merely read the action phrases a second time. Two weeks later, participants 85 
perform a two-phase recognition test. All action phrases from the two encoding phases and some 86 
novel action phrases are presented on a screen. For each action phrase, participants decide whether 87 
the action phrase was presented at encoding (i.e., is ‘old’) or is novel. When participants judge an 88 
action phrase to be ‘old’, they are asked to decide if they performed the action phrase or merely read 89 
it in the first encoding phase. Lindner et al. were interested in the extent to which different types of 90 
additional encoding in the second encoding phase would lead participants to claim they had 91 
performed those actions when they had only read them in the first encoding phase. They showed that 92 
observation in particular led to increased false claims of performance compared to merely re-reading 93 
action phrases. In other words, observation of previously encoded action phrases biased participants’ 94 
source judgments in favor of ‘performed’ over ‘read’ responses.  95 
Here, we tested whether observation would still lead to false claims of self-performance if a) 96 
observing someone else perform an action was the only instance of encoding the action (though note 97 
that in some variations of the observation inflation paradigm, participants also show observation 98 
inflation for novel actions), and if b) the task at test was to recall self-performed actions rather than 99 
make a source-monitoring judgement. If observing actions generally results in false memories of self-100 
performance, we would, as the critical measure, expect participants to falsely recall observed actions 101 
as self-performed.  102 
To test the role of the motor trace in false memories of self-performance, we modified the type of 103 
actions participants performed. Lindner et al. (2010) asked participants to act out action phrases. 104 
Source confusion here may be based on confusion of the verbal in addition to the motor trace. We 105 
wanted to limit verbal encoding to minimize source confusion resulting from non-motor traces. Thus, 106 
rather than using action phrases, we asked participants to use any part of their body or combination of 107 
body parts to take turns performing actions in response to shape cues. While action memory research 108 
has largely focused on enactment of action phrases as in Lindner et al. (for review see Engelkamp, 109 
1998; Nilsson, 2000), there are precedents for investigating memory of body movements such as 110 
dance moves and movement patterns (Foley, Bouffard, Raag, & DiSanto-Rose, 1991; Helstrup, 2005; 111 
Smyth, Pearson, & Pendleton, 1988). Even though these actions are non-object-directed and 112 
unfamiliar, this should not affect potential motor system activation. In fact, the seminal papers 113 
revealing motor activation during action observation in humans (e.g., Brass et al., 2000; Stürmer et 114 
al., 2000; Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham & Haggard, 2004; Oosterhof, Wiggett, 115 
Diedrichsen, Tipper, & Downing, 2010; Chong, Cunnington, Williams, Kanwisher, & Mattingley, 116 
2008) used non-object directed actions, and motoric activation during action observation is typically 117 
as least as high for intransitive or unfamiliar actions (e.g., Hetu et al., 2011; Press, Bird, Walsh, & 118 
Heyes, 2008; Nicholson, Roser & Bach, 2017), which minimize alternative non-motoric encoding 119 
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strategies such as merely memorizing the objects used, and using them as cues to the actions 120 
associated with them (e.g., Decety et al., 1997; Rumiati et al., 2005; Tessari et al., 2007). 121 
Conceptually replicating the observation inflation effect in this novel recall paradigm will allow us to 122 
test two predictions of the motor simulation account of false memories of self-performance after 123 
observation. First, we know from unconscious plagiarism research that if asked to recall ideas, 124 
participants not only steal partner’s ideas but also give away own ideas to a partner (Hollins, Lange, 125 
Berry & Dennis, 2016; Hollins, Lange, Dennis & Longmore, 2016). If source memory for actions 126 
conforms to the same rules, we would expect participants to commit source errors not only when they 127 
recall own actions, but to also commit them when they recall actions they observed their partner 128 
perform. In other words, in addition to observation leading to false memories of self-performance, we 129 
expect that self-performance would also lead to false memories of observation. In fact there is 130 
precedence for false memories of performance and observation in source recognition studies in the 131 
action memory domain (Hornstein & Mulligan, 2004; Leynes & Kakadia, 2013; Rosa & Gutchess, 132 
2011). In motor simulation views, however, only the former “plagiarism” error is easy to explain. 133 
Action mirroring creates a motor trace of the observed action that is added to its visual memory 134 
representation. During recall, there is conflict between visual and motoric memory traces, one 135 
suggesting observation and the other self-performance, which causes some of the actions to be 136 
misattributed. However, such views are hard-pressed to account for the reverse error, where 137 
participants misattribute an action to their partner that they had performed themselves. For self-138 
performed actions, both motoric- and visual-memory indicate self-performance; there should thus 139 
never be a conflict about the source of a self-performed action. Motor accounts therefore predict a 140 
striking asymmetry: while people should readily claim others’ actions as their own, they should very 141 
rarely do the reverse. Second, under a mirror neuron network account a disruption of the motor 142 
system – due to a secondary task that taxes it – during observation should lead to a reduction in 143 
observation inflation. Such effects of motor system load on action observation and interpretation 144 
have been demonstrated before, with concurrent motor execution either biasing (e.g., Tipper & Bach, 145 
2008) or disrupting the representation of observed actions or of other visuospatial material (e.g., 146 
Quinn & Ralston, 1986; in working memory, Smyth & Pendleton, 1989;  Smyth, Pearson & 147 
Pendleton, 1988; Lawrence, Myerson, Oonk & Abrams, 2001; Can, Schack & Koester, 2017; for a 148 
general review see, Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007; Avenanti, Candidi, & Urgesi, 2013). We will 149 
therefore test whether impaired motoric encoding of partner’s actions, due to a taxed motor system, 150 
results in a reduction in source errors when retrieving own actions. 151 
In sum, the present study will test the following. In Experiment 1 we will determine whether the 152 
observation inflation effect reported by Lindner et al. (2010) can be conceptually replicated in a 153 
simpler experimental paradigm, which cannot be explained on the basis of a verbal or object-based 154 
encoding of the actions. This experiment will also provide a measure of the tendency commit the 155 
reverse source error, i.e., to give away own actions. Then in Experiments 2 and 3, we will test the 156 
further predictions of a motor simulation account by investigating the impact of concurrent motor and 157 
verbal loads during the encoding of partner’s actions on source errors during the recall of own 158 
actions. 159 
2 Experiment 1 160 
2.1 Method 161 
Source memory for actions 
 
5
2.1.1 Participants 162 
37 members of the public participated for payment of £8. Two participants were excluded from 163 
analysis for not attending all sessions. The experiment was reviewed and approved by the Plymouth 164 
University, School of Psychology ethics committee. All participants gave written informed consent in 165 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 166 
2.1.2 Procedure 167 
Participants attended the first session believing they were paired with another naïve participant but in 168 
fact were paired with a confederate. Participant and confederate were briefed together by the 169 
experimenter and told they would take part in a memory study, with the second session taking place 170 
the next day. In the first session, participants completed the generation phase. Participants were 171 
instructed that would have to act out a set of 15 shapes (A, C, F, H, I, J, K, L, O, P, T, V, X, ᇞ,	ൌ), 172 
with any part of their body or combination of body parts. The experimenter then demonstrated six 173 
different ways a shape can be created with the entire body or combination of body parts for a shape 174 
cue not used in the experiment. Participants were cued with a printed label of each shape. Members 175 
of the pair took turns generating actions for each cue, interleaving performing and observing actions 176 
such that performing an action in response to a cue was followed by observing the other person 177 
perform an action in response to the same cue. Each participant generated a total of 3 actions per cue, 178 
resulting in 45 performed and 45 observed actions overall (see Figure 1 for participants acting out the 179 
shape A). Participants were told to observe their partners during partner-generation to avoid 180 
duplicating exemplars that had already been created for a cue. The participants were explicitly told to 181 
produce the shapes so that they seemed correct from their perspective, and ignore how they would 182 
look to their partner (i.e. confederate). 183 
Confederates (n = 5) were briefed in full about the experiment prior to their participation. They 184 
learned up to fifteen ways each shape could be made and were instructed to avoid duplicating the 185 
participants’ actions. 186 
The naïve participants returned a day later for the test phase. Participants were shown the 15 shape 187 
labels one at a time in random order. The Recall own group were asked to re-perform the actions they 188 
had performed themselves and were warned not to retrieve actions they saw the other person 189 
perform. The Recall partner group was asked to re-perform the actions they had observed their 190 
partner perform and were warned not to perform actions they had generated themselves. Participants 191 
were asked to re-perform as many exemplars from the appropriate source (self or other) as they could 192 
remember for each of the shape cues, working at their own pace. 193 
2.1.3 Experimental Design 194 
We manipulated the retrieval task at test in a between-subjects manipulation (Recall own: N=18; 195 
Recall partner: N=17). Each action retrieved by participants was coded as a correct recall, a source 196 
error (the action was from the correct or incorrect source for the task respectively) or an intrusion 197 
error (the action was not generated at encoding and therefore neither seen nor performed). As we 198 
discuss in 2.2 Analytic Approach, our focus is particularly on the number of source errors 199 
participants committed in both retrieval tasks. 200 
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2.1.4 Action coding 201 
Photographs were taken of all actions performed during generation and test for both participant and 202 
confederate. These were coded by the experimenter (NL), using a coding scheme developed in a pilot 203 
study. For each shape between 20 and 40 distinct solutions were identified and assigned categorized 204 
numbers. The generation and retrieval phase were then coded separately. Actions were coded as 205 
matching the action in the coding scheme when participants performed the exact movement. Crossing 206 
one’s forearms to make an X was coded as a different action than crossing one’s arms at the elbows 207 
to make an X, for example. It was necessary to distinguish shapes in such a subtle manner, in order to 208 
rule out that participants could simply remember in a verbal format how the action were produced 209 
(e.g. making an X with the arms). Pilot testing has shown that this task indeed causes participants to 210 
perform their shapes repeatedly with the same body parts, so that simple verbal encoding was 211 
impossible, or at least very difficult.  212 
To test the reliability of the coding scheme, a subset of the photographs was coded by two 213 
independent raters naïve to the purpose of the study and the condition of each participant. The 214 
independent raters coded the photos for the first twenty participants, with one rater coding generation 215 
phase photographs from the first half and test phase photographs from the second half of those 216 
twenty participants, while the other rater coded generation phase photographs from the second half 217 
and test phase photographs from the first half of participants. Inter-rater agreement between the 218 
experimenter and the two raters was 87% and 91% each, confirming the reliability of the coding 219 
scheme. Subsequent analyses were solely based on the experimenter’s judgements. 220 
(Table 1 about here) 221 
2.2 Analytic approach 222 
Each action retrieved by participants was coded as a correct recall, a source error or an intrusion 223 
error. Table 1 shows the frequency of those responses for all experiments. We will report the 224 
conventional analyses of the effect of manipulations on the frequency of correct responses, source 225 
errors and intrusion errors, with source errors the focus of our interest. However, one concern about 226 
source errors in any memory retrieval task is that source errors might either be a genuine memory 227 
error (the measure of interest) or simply a guess – an ad-hoc solution generated during the retrieval 228 
task – that just happened to be an item also generated at encoding. Source errors (i.e., false source 229 
responses to items correctly recognized as old) are therefore often analyzed in relation to false source 230 
responses to novel items (i.e., false source responses to items falsely recognized as old) by measuring 231 
either the difference or the ratio of both types of errors. 232 
Lindner et al. (2010) were interested in the specific effect additional observation had on shifting 233 
participants’ response at source test to falsely respond ‘performed’.  To show that the observation 234 
inflation effect was not just an effect of guessing, they contrasted the proportion of false ‘performed’ 235 
responses after observation in the second encoding phase with the proportion of false ‘performed’ 236 
responses for actions that had not been presented in the second encoding phase. Their critical 237 
measure was therefore the difference of false ‘performed’ responses when those items had been 238 
additionally observed in contrast to when they had not been observed. False ‘performed’ responses to 239 
actions that had not been observed presents the baseline of participants giving false ‘performed’ 240 
responses irrespective of observing someone else perform those actions. The true effect of 241 
observation in their metric is therefore the additional proportion of false ‘performed’ responses 242 
observation results in beyond the basic guessing error.  243 
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However, this metric cannot be easily transferred to our recall task given the total number of 244 
responses at recall differs by participants and observation is the sole encoding instance of an action. 245 
We therefore developed a critical measure that would similarly take accidental guessing into account 246 
and look at an effect of observation beyond that, in conceptual replication of Lindner et al.’s (2010) 247 
metric. We used a Monte Carlo procedure to simulate how many source errors participants would 248 
commit if they were guessing and had just generated potential shapes for each symbol “on the fly” 249 
during the test phase, rather than genuinely retrieving them from what they had previously either seen 250 
or performed. The simulation was based on the distribution of actions generated by participants in the 251 
generation phase in response to the shape cues. We simulated the test phase of the experiment for 252 
each participant and each shape separately to take into account differences between individual 253 
participants, differing frequency profiles for the different shapes, and the typicality of individual 254 
items. To achieve this, we used as much of the participant-provided observed data as possible to 255 
ensure that the only simulated part of the experiment would be the test phase. 256 
As a first step of the simulation process, we determined frequency norms for the different actions 257 
generated for each of the 15 shapes used in the experiment, from all participants who took part in the 258 
encoding phase. Participants generated between 20 and 40 different ways of performing each shape 259 
across the experiment, with some actions produced more frequently than others. For each shape, we 260 
converted those frequency profiles of the different actions into probability distributions, reflecting the 261 
relative frequency that a particular action was produced for a given shape. For each shape, the 262 
probabilities summed to 1 to represent the entire action space. 263 
We next applied these distributions to the observed test phase for each participant. To simulate a 264 
participant’s performance we took the total number of actions they performed (i.e., reported at recall) 265 
for each shape in the test phase and randomly selected this number of actions from the overall 266 
probability distribution for that shape. This sampling was done without replacement to match the 267 
experimental procedure of only retrieving an item once. This provided us with an estimate of which 268 
actions would most likely be chosen by a participant if the participant had just generated novel 269 
solutions at test, i.e., guessed a number of unique items without memory, under the assumption that 270 
these novel solutions at test would follow the same frequency distribution as during the generation 271 
phase. We then estimated how many of these novel (simulated) solutions matched this participant’s 272 
self-generated actions, matched the actions they observed their partner perform, or were neither seen 273 
nor performed by this participant. We repeated the sampling procedure 500 times for each participant 274 
to arrive at stable estimates. As with the observed performance, we summed the simulated 275 
performance across all shapes. Source errors were now novel (simulated) solutions that happened to 276 
be partner actions in the Recall own and self-generated actions in the Recall partner task.  277 
To estimate how many of the observed source errors were the product of guessing we had to scale the 278 
simulated performance to the observed performance, based on the number of intrusion errors (actions 279 
that were not generated at encoding) committed by participants in the test phase. The assumption 280 
here is that intrusion errors must be the result of guessing (e.g. based on how typical or common the 281 
actions are), because those actions do not contain source-specifying information. We created the ratio 282 
of simulated source errors over all simulated errors for the simulated data for each participant 283 
(Equation 1) and applied that ratio to that participant’s observed data (Equation 2) to estimate how 284 
many source errors we would predict to observe if the participant was guessing given the number of 285 
intrusion errors that particular participant committed in the test phase. This gave us the number of 286 
predicted source errors, i.e., an estimate of the number of source errors we have to expect if recall 287 
was based on the probability of the individual actions, in addition to the number of observed source 288 
errors from the experiment. 289 
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 295 
 All subsequent analyses we performed were based on these data, with data type (observed, 296 
predicted) used as a factor, i.e., in Experiment 1 we can ask whether source errors (for Recall own 297 
and Recall partner tasks) exceed the frequency we would expect if participants were guessing. Given 298 
our theoretical questions, we will focus on that aspect of the data but will briefly discuss the 299 
conventional analyses of the data for a complete account of the experimental results. 300 
2.3 Results 301 
2.3.1 Generation phase 302 
While participants were instructed to avoid duplicating their own or their partner’s actions during 303 
generation, some participants still committed such errors. On average, participants duplicated 0.51% 304 
(SD=1.22%) of the actions they had already performed themselves and 1.27% (SD=1.81%) of actions 305 
performed by the confederate. Confederates never duplicated their own actions and mistakenly 306 
duplicated on average 0.57% (SD=1.25%) of the participant’s actions. Partner-duplicated actions 307 
were removed from the experiment, and all subsequent analyses were restricted to actions that had 308 
only been performed by one person. 309 
2.3.2 Test phase 310 
We will first briefly describe the conventional analyses of the data. Performance at retrieval (correct 311 
responses, source errors, intrusion errors) was analyzed with multiple 2 Task (Recall own, Recall 312 
partner) ANOVAs. Overall, more items were correctly recalled in the Recall own than Recall partner 313 
task, F(1,33)=35.29, MSe=15.21, p<.001, η²=.517. There was no evidence for a difference in the 314 
number of source errors reported, F<1, but novel intrusions occurred more often in the Recall partner 315 
than Recall own task, F(1,33)=4.15, MSe=8.11, p=.05, η²=.112. 316 
Next we turn our attention to the main purpose of our work, and analyze the frequency of source 317 
errors observed versus that predicted by guessing, as shown in Figure 2. Analyzing the data as a 2 318 
Task (Recall own, Recall partner) x 2 Data type (Observed, Predicted) mixed ANOVA with repeated 319 
measures on the second factor, shows no main effect of Task, F<1, but, importantly, a main effect of 320 
Data type, F(1,33)=5.64, MSe=12.53, p=.024, ηρ²=.146. Source errors were observed more frequently 321 
than predicted, demonstrating the hypothesized observation inflation effect. However, there was no 322 
interaction between Task and Data type, F(1,33)=1.03, MSe=10.80, p=.32, ηρ²=.030. In subsequent 323 
step-down analyses, we tested whether observed source errors were greater than predicted in each of 324 
the two retrieval tasks, that is, whether both the “donating” and “stealing” effects was observed 325 
(Perfect et al., 2009; Hollins, Lange, Dennis & Berry, 2016; Hollins, Lange, Dennis & Longmore, 326 
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2016). Indeed, observed frequencies surpassed predicted frequencies in the Recall own task, 327 
t(17)=3.92, p<.001, dav=1.28 and in the Recall partner task, t(16)=1.84, p=.042, dav=0.59, both one-328 
tailed. 329 
2.4 Discussion 330 
We successfully conceptually replicated the observation inflation effect of Lindner et al. (2010) in a 331 
new paradigm. Using a single encoding phase and non-verbalisable actions, we found false free-332 
recall of observed actions as being self-performed, ruling out that the effect merely reflects an 333 
enhanced verbal or object based encoding of the seen actions. Importantly, however, we also 334 
observed the opposite effect: the tendency to attribute self-performed actions to a partner. This is in 335 
line with reports of participants giving away ideas in the verbal domain (Hollins, Lange, Dennis & 336 
Berry, 2016; Hollins, Lange, Dennis & Longmore, 2016; Perfect, Field & Jones, 2009) and action 337 
domain (Hornstein & Mulligan, 2004; Leynes & Kakadia, 2013; Rosa & Gutchess, 2011). 338 
This latter effect argues against a simple motor activation account of observation inflation, according 339 
to which no confusion should arise for self-performed actions because both visual and motoric 340 
memories indicate self-performance. However, while there was no significant difference, Figure 2 341 
shows that the effect in the Recall own task was greater than in the Recall partner task. This pattern 342 
would be in line with predictions of motor theories of observation inflation (e.g. Lindner et al., 2010) 343 
while the reverse error may only be an artefact of guessing processes. Thus, while the reverse error 344 
exists clearly for verbal material (Hollins, Lange, Dennis & Berry, 2016; Hollins, Lange, Dennis & 345 
Longmore, 2016), it may not for actions. 346 
Alternatively, the less robust effect in the Recall partner task may emerge from using confederates. 347 
Confederates were shown possible actions beforehand and took part in the experiment repeatedly. 348 
They may have therefore performed the shapes in a more pronounced and/or prototypical way than 349 
naïve participants’. In fact, some naïve participants did report that they suspected they had been 350 
paired with a confederate from how the confederate performed the actions. It is therefore possible 351 
that knowledge of the confederates or the quality of confederates’ performance would influence the 352 
memory performance at test. When looking for own actions, observed actions that were performed 353 
quite clearly and confidently may be more strongly represented in memory and intrude as source 354 
errors.  355 
To prevent this potential influence, we paired two naïve participants in Experiment 2. If Experiment 356 
2 shows a similar asymmetry, we would have to assume that the difference in effect size is a function 357 
of the retrieval task. In contrast, if the difference emerged from the potentially biased action 358 
production of the confederates, it should now be eliminated. Experiment 2 also more directly tested 359 
the motor simulation account of observation inflation by means of a concurrent load during encoding. 360 
3 Experiment 2 361 
According to motor system activation views, observation inflation arises because participants’ motor 362 
systems resonate with the actions they observe and produce an internal replica of the action, as if it 363 
were self-performed (Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & Umiltà, 1999; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & 364 
Rizzolatti, 2002). Occupying the motor system with a secondary motor task should therefore prevent 365 
the formation of such traces. Indeed, several studies show that secondary motor task bias or disrupt 366 
the formation of action representations or motor plans (cf. Bach, Khalaf Allami, Tucker & Ellis, 367 
2014; Vetter & Wolpert, 2000; Zwickel, Grosjean, & Prinz, 2007, Tipper & Bach, 2008), and the 368 
representation of visuospatial material and its encoding in working memory (e.g., Quinn & Ralston, 369 
Source memory for actions 
 
10
This is a provisional file, not the final typeset article 
1986; Smyth & Pendleton, 1989;  Smyth et al., 1988; Lawrence et al., 2001; Can et al. 2017; for a 370 
general review see, Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007) . Memories lacking the mirrored motoric 371 
information should be less likely to be confused for self-performed actions. In fact, Lindner, Schain 372 
and Echterhoff (2016) recently showed that claims of self-performance after observation were 373 
reduced when participants had performed incongruent rather than congruent actions while watching 374 
them.  375 
Thus, in Experiment 2, we asked participants to execute simple motor behaviors at the same time as 376 
they observed their partner’s actions. This motor performance should interfere with the encoding of 377 
motor representations of observed actions, leaving only the visual-perceptual component of the 378 
memory trace. We used two types of motor system load to compare against a no load control 379 
condition. First, a whole-body motor execution load task was used to directly engage execution-380 
related motor resources, in line with Lindner et al. (2016). Participants were asked to walk in place, 381 
swinging their arms, as they watched their partner perform an action. These whole body movements 382 
should interfere with the generation of any motor representation of the observed action, irrespective 383 
of the body part(s) used. Similar motor tasks have been shown to disrupt recall of action phrases 384 
(Helstrup, 2001; Saltz & Donnenwerth-Nolan, 1981; Smyth et al., 1988), the encoding of visuospatial 385 
material in working memory (Quinn & Ralston, 1986; Smyth & Pendleton, 1989; Lawrence et al., 386 
2001; Can et al. 2017), or the acquisition of motor skills during mental practice and imitation 387 
learning (Bach, Allami Khalaf, Tucker & Ellis, 2014). Indeed, prior research has shown that 388 
concurrent motor performance affects perception of non-biological and biological action stimuli (for 389 
reviews, see Avenanti et al., 2013; Schuetz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007), leading to reductions in 390 
subsequent action judgments (Bach & Tipper, 2007; Tipper & Bach, 2008), and interpretations 391 
(Hamilton, Wolpert, & Frith, 2004; Vetter & Wolpert, 2000) when produced actions are different 392 
from what is currently observed.  If motor simulation underlies observation inflation, participants 393 
should therefore report fewer partner actions falsely as their own if motoric activation is disrupted 394 
due to this secondary task. In contrast, no such difference should be observed if the effects emerge 395 
from general source confusion processes outside the motor system. 396 
Second, we used an action planning load task to engage higher-level spatial or action planning 397 
resources. We asked participants to remember Corsi-block sequences whilst they watched their 398 
partner perform an action. In the Corsi-block task, the experimenter taps a spatial path on a random 399 
sequence of blocks arranged on a board. The participant is then asked to reproduce the sequence of 400 
taps in the same order. To estimate a participant’s span, the length of the sequence increases until the 401 
participant is no longer able to repeat the sequence in the correct order. The length of sequence 402 
participants last produced correctly is commonly referred to as participants’ visual-spatial working 403 
memory span (Milner, 1971). Action planning is typically assumed to rely on such a visuospatial 404 
encoding of the action one intends to perform (Hommel et al., 2001; Hesse & Franz, 2009). It has 405 
been argued that mirror neuron activation might not reflect only a motoric encoding of the actions, 406 
but also such planning processes (e.g., Hickock, 2009; Bach, Nicholson & Hudson, 2014; Csibra & 407 
Gergely, 2007). Neuroimaging studies show activation during movement planning in the prefrontal, 408 
posterior parietal and premotor cortex (Hanakawa, Dimyan, & Hallett, 2008; Ikkai & Curtis, 2011), 409 
some of the regions implicated in mirror neuron activation (Iacoboni et al., 2001; Koski, Iacoboni, 410 
Dubeau, Woods, & Mazziotta, 2001). The Corsi task has been known for a long time to lead to 411 
mutual interference effects in tasks that require visuospatial processing (e.g, Smyth and Scholey, 412 
1994; Della Salla et al., 1999; Vandierendonck et al., 2004; for a review, see Zimmer et al., 2008). 413 
 414 
To test for the possibility that action confusability emerged from such action planning (rather than 415 
Source memory for actions 
 
11
low-level motor) traces of the actions, we asked participants to remember Corsi-block sequences 416 
whilst they watched their partner perform an action. The participant was asked to reproduce the 417 
sequence after observing their partner perform an action, meaning the participant had to encode the 418 
spatial path tapped by the experimenter as an action intention for later reproduction. Since intentions 419 
for future action production are encoded motorically (Brandimonte & Passolunghi, 1994; Freeman & 420 
Ellis, 2003; Gallivan, McLean, Valyear, Pettypiece, & Culham, 2011) and kept in working memory 421 
until actions are executed (Ohbayashi, Ohki & Miyashita, 2003), we expect the motor system to be 422 
occupied with that action plan for future performance during observation of partner's actions.   423 
According to motor simulation views of observation inflation, either or both types of concurrent 424 
motor system activity should reduce motor simulation of observed actions and subsequently reduce 425 
the number of observed actions falsely recalled as self-performed.  426 
As a direct consequence of the theoretical predictions, the experimental design in Experiment 2 was 427 
unbalanced. Concurrent load could only be directly applied to observed actions, not to performed 428 
actions. Since concurrent load was applied to blocks of trials, nominally there will be performed 429 
actions encoded in Action planning load or Motor execution load blocks, but self-performance of 430 
actions always took place without a concurrent load. Any effects of concurrent load on performed 431 
actions in those blocks can therefore not be directly an effect of any concurrent load but may be an 432 
effect of, for example, encoding context, attention or distraction resulting from switching between 433 
target and concurrent load tasks. We will first report the full analysis, looking at all trials of 434 
performed and observed actions in the concurrent load blocks. Given the imbalance in the design, we 435 
will then specifically analyse the subset of data we manipulated directly and have theoretical 436 
predictions about. 437 
3.1 Method 438 
3.1.1 Participants 439 
40 members of the public participated for payment of £12. Three participants did not attend all 440 
sessions and their data were excluded from the analysis. The experiment was reviewed and approved 441 
by the Plymouth University, School of Psychology ethics committee. All participants gave written 442 
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 443 
3.1.2 Procedure 444 
Participants attended the first session in pairs. Prior to the experiment, each participant’s Corsi-block 445 
span was assessed. The length of the tapped sequence was increased up to the point that participants 446 
failed to correctly reproduce the sequence twice. Participants’ span was the maximum length of 447 
sequence they successfully reproduced twice. Participants were given the same instructions as in 448 
Experiment 1 to create exemplars for 15 shape cues with any part of their body or combination of 449 
body parts. We asked participants to create 4, not 3 exemplars as in Experiment 1, to compensate for 450 
the addition of concurrent load conditions. The 15 cues were split into 3 blocks of five cues each, 451 
with a concurrent load (Action planning, Motor execution) added to the action observation trials for 452 
two of those blocks (assignment of cues to concurrent load conditions and order of those conditions 453 
was counterbalanced across participants), and no load to the remaining block. Participants now 454 
performed 20 and observed 20 actions in each of the 3 concurrent load conditions. In the Action 455 
planning load condition, participants were shown a Corsi-block sequence at their span prior to 456 
observing their partner perform an action, then asked to reproduce the sequence after the observation. 457 
In the Motor execution load condition, participants were asked to walk in place, with exaggerated 458 
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movement of both arms and legs, as they observed their partner. Performance of own actions always 459 
took place under no load. 460 
Participants returned to retrieve either their own or their partner’s actions the next day, with the 461 
retrieval task identical to Experiment 1. Responses were scored and analyzed as in Experiment 1. 462 
3.1.3 Experimental Design 463 
As in Experiment 1, we manipulated the retrieval task at test between-subjects (Recall own: N=19; 464 
Recall partner: N=18). Additionally, we manipulated the concurrent load during observation within-465 
subjects (No load, Action planning load, Motor execution load for 5 cues each). Thus in the Recall 466 
own task, participants recalled actions they had performed themselves without a secondary load, 467 
while avoiding reporting actions they had observed under no load, an action planning load and a 468 
motor execution load. In the Recall partner task, participants recalled actions they had observed 469 
under no load, an action planning load and a motor execution load, while avoiding reporting actions 470 
they had performed under no load. Since we manipulated concurrent load only during observation of 471 
actions, we will focus on the effects of concurrent load on the false retrieval of observed actions in 472 
the Recall own task. 473 
3.2 Results 474 
3.2.1 Generation phase 475 
Concurrent load had no impact on the tendency for participants to repeat their own actions (No load: 476 
M=5.13%, SD=5.75%; Action planning load: M=5.54%, SD=7.42%; Motor load: M=6.35%, 477 
SD=6.11%), F<1. However, concurrent load did influence the tendency to duplicate a partners 478 
actions (No load: M=9.73%, SD=6.25; Action planning load: M=13.78%, SD=7.75%; Motor load: 479 
M=12.16%, SD=6.93%), F (2,72)=3.37, MSe=1.83, p=.040, ηρ²=.086, (with Bonferroni-adjustment, 480 
none of the individual pairwise comparisons differed significantly). For the analysis of retrieval 481 
performance, only those items that had only been performed by one of the participants in the pair 482 
were included. 483 
3.2.2 Test phase 484 
Performance at retrieval (correct responses, source errors, intrusion errors) was analyzed as 485 
multiple 2 Task (Recall own, Recall partner) x 3 Concurrent load (No load, Action planning load, 486 
Motor execution load) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the second factor. 487 
Correct recall was higher in the Recall own than Recall partner task, F(1,35)=17.64, MSe=3.39, 488 
p<.001, ηρ²=.335. There was a main effect of concurrent load, F(2,70)=3.49, MSe=2.34, p=.036, 489 
ηρ² =.091, with Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons not showing a significant difference 490 
between concurrent load conditions, though testing the control condition against the average of the 491 
two load conditions shows that correct recall was lower when actions were observed under load, 492 
F(1,35)=6.29, MSe=23.95, p=.017, ηρ² =.152.The interaction was not significant, F<1. 493 
For source errors, there were no significant effects of Task, F(1,35)=2.10, MSe=1.90, p=.16, 494 
ηρ²=.057, or Concurrent load, F(2,70)=1.27, MSe=1.7, p=.29, ηρ² =.035, nor was there a 495 
significant interaction, F<1. Similarly, intrusions errors did not show main effects of Task, F<1, or 496 
Concurrent load, F(2,70)=1.41, MSe=2.22, p=.25, ηρ² =.039. There was no significant interaction, 497 
F<1. 498 
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As in Experiment 1, we will now turn to the comparison of the rates of source errors observed 499 
versus predicted by guessing.  Participants generated fewer items per condition in Experiment 2 500 
than Experiment 1. This resulted in fewer errors in absolute terms, but the error rates were 501 
equivalent in both experiments with 19% of partner actions and 17% of self-generated actions 502 
reported as source errors in Experiment 1 compared to 15% and 19% respectively in Experiment 2. 503 
We first compared source errors in the Recall own and Recall partner task as in Experiment 1, to 504 
test the prediction of the motor simulation account that more source errors would be made when 505 
recalling own rather than partner actions. Since concurrent load was manipulated only when 506 
participants observed their partner’s actions, only the no concurrent load condition was used in this 507 
comparison. A 2 Task (Recall own, Recall partner) x 2 Data type (Observed, Predicted) mixed 508 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor did not reveal a main effect of Task, 509 
F(1,35)=1.01, MSe=2.59, p=.32, ηρ²=.028. As in Experiment 1, source errors were observed more 510 
frequently than predicted from guessing, F(1,35)=30.46, MSe=1.67, p<.001, ηρ²=.465.  The 511 
interaction was not significant, F(1,35)=1.61, MSe=1.67, p=.21, ηρ²=.044. Stepdown analyses 512 
showed that observed errors surpassed predicted errors in both retrieval tasks, see Figure 3, but the 513 
effect was smaller in the Recall own task, t(18)=3.15, p=.003,dav=0.98, than the Recall partner task, 514 
t(17)=4.58, p<.001,dav=1.26, both one-tailed. This means that the higher rate of errors in the Recall 515 
own task in Experiment 1 was not replicated here with naïve participants.  516 
We then tested whether concurrent (action planning or motor execution) load would reduce source 517 
errors in the Recall own task, as shown in Figure 4. We analyzed the data for the Recall own group 518 
with a 2 Data type (Observed, Predicted) x 3 Concurrent load (No load, Action planning load, Motor 519 
execution load) repeated measures ANOVA. As before, source errors were observed more frequently 520 
than predicted from guessing, F(1,18)=22.57, MSe=1.77, p<.001, ηρ²=.556. There was no evidence 521 
for an effect of Concurrent load nor was there a significant interaction, both Fs<1. In subsequent 522 
step-down analyses, we tested whether observed source errors were greater than predicted in every 523 
concurrent load condition. Observed frequencies significantly surpassed predicted frequencies in the 524 
Control, t(18)=3.15, p=.003,dav=0.98, Action planning load, t(18)=2.73, p=.007, dav=0.81, and Motor 525 
execution load condition, t(18)=2.55, p=.010, dav=0.91, all comparisons one-tailed. 526 
3.3 Discussion 527 
Experiment 2 replicates the results of Experiment 1. Both observation inflation and the reverse error 528 
of falsely recalling self-performed actions occurred more frequently than expected from guessing. If 529 
anything, source errors were more frequent in the Recall partner than the Recall own task. This 530 
suggests that the smaller effect in the Recall partner task in Experiment 1 was due to the use of 531 
confederates. Even though the difference was not significant, it is in line with our prior work in the 532 
verbal domain that has similarly shown higher rates for giving away compared to stealing ideas 533 
(Hollins, Lange, Dennis & Berry, 2016; Hollins, Lange, Dennis & Longmore, 2016). 534 
This pattern of bidirectional source errors in Experiment 2 is not consistent with a motor simulation 535 
account of observation inflation. Motor traces generated during action observation would only predict 536 
observation inflation, not giving away self-performed actions to the partner. In addition, such views 537 
would predict that motor load during action observation should lead to fewer of those actions being 538 
falsely retrieved as self-performed, as own motor execution should interfere with generating motoric 539 
memory traces. We found no evidence for this account. Neither the motor load, nor the action 540 
planning load, decreased source errors. This was not because source errors were at floor. Source 541 
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errors surpassed predicted frequencies in each load condition quite substantially (d>0.81 in all 542 
conditions).  543 
Because we did not observe an effect of concurrent load, it is possible that the manipulation we used 544 
had no effect on encoding of observed actions. Note though that similar tasks have been used before 545 
to interfere with motoric encoding of observed actions (for reviews see Avenanti et al., 2013; 546 
Schuetz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). Indeed, we did see that concurrent load increased partner-547 
duplications at generation, consistent with its demonstrated effect on working memory (Quinn & 548 
Ralston, 1986; Smyth & Pendleton, 1989; Lawrence et al., 2001; Can et al. 2017), and decreased 549 
correct recall of partner actions (this simple effect was marginally significant, F(2,34)=3.17, 550 
MSe=2.33, p=.055, ηρ²=.157). This means, while there was no evidence for the predicted effect of the 551 
manipulation on source errors in the Recall own task, the manipulation did affect participants’ 552 
performance in the experiment overall. 553 
Another possibility is that the free report task we chose as the memory test cannot clearly reflect an 554 
effect of the manipulation on source confusion specifically. To make source judgements in a free 555 
recall task, participants first have to generate an action and then decide to report or withhold that 556 
action from report, depending on whether the inferred source matches the task requirement (recall 557 
own or recall partner). Participants' report therefore conflates generation of solutions and source 558 
decisions about these solutions, both of which can be separately affected by experimental 559 
manipulations. It is therefore possible that participants in a free report simply neglect the source of 560 
retrieved actions and report all actions that come to mind without engaging in explicit monitoring of 561 
the source. Even though our calculations suggest that guessing cannot account for the source errors 562 
we observed, forcing participants to consider items more carefully may reveal an effect of the 563 
concurrent load manipulation on observation inflation. The retrieval task in Experiment 3 was 564 
therefore changed to instruct participants to inspect every action they reported at retrieval for source-565 
appropriateness. 566 
A third possibility is that the cognitive load introduced by the secondary task affected participants’ 567 
ability to sufficiently encode the actions they observed. In that case, it would be plausible that such 568 
resource depletion would increase source errors while the motor component of the secondary task 569 
prevented motor simulation and decreased source errors. In that case, we would have expected to see 570 
that source errors were in total lower in the motor execution than the action planning load condition. 571 
We found no evidence for that. In Experiment 3, we will test this possibility explicitly and introduce 572 
a non-motor task with high cognitive load to compare against the action planning load. 573 
4 Experiment 3 574 
Experiment 2 did not show the reduction in source errors predicted by a motor simulation account of 575 
observation inflation. It is however possible that participants simply neglected to consider the source 576 
of actions at retrieval and simply reported everything that came to mind as they completed the 577 
standard free report task. The retrieval task in Experiment 3 was therefore separated into two separate 578 
stages, following an extended recall procedure developed by Bousfield and Rosner (1970), and more 579 
recently used by Kahana, Dolan, Sauder and Wingfield (2005) and Hollins, Lange, Berry & 580 
Dennis(2016). As in the these tasks, we asked participants to perform all actions that came to mind 581 
when asked to recall either own or partner actions. For each action performed, participants were then 582 
explicitly asked to consider its source carefully and to decide whether or not it was compliant with 583 
their retrieval goal (i.e., to recall their own or their partner’s actions). The actions that participants 584 
reported are therefore only those they had explicitly attributed to the required source.  585 
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Additionally, we replaced the motor execution load from Experiment 2 with a verbal load task to be 586 
able to pinpoint a specific motor load effect compared to a generic cognitive one. While a 587 
comparison of motor execution to verbal load may be interesting, both loads differ in their cognitive 588 
difficulty, confounding difficulty and modality-specifics. The Action planning load task, on the other 589 
hand, should be of comparative task difficulty to the verbal load task for participants since they are 590 
tested at span if both cases. If source errors are due to motor planning processes, then we would 591 
expect to see a reduction of false reports of partner actions as self-performed only under concurrent 592 
action planning but not concurrent verbal load. In contrast, if they emerge from a more general 593 
source, both loads should affect source errors equally. 594 
4.1 Method 595 
4.1.1 Participants 596 
42 members of the public participated for payment of £12. Four participants did not attend all 597 
sessions and their data were excluded from the analysis. The experiment was reviewed and approved 598 
by the Plymouth University, School of Psychology ethics committee. All participants gave written 599 
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 600 
4.1.2 Procedure 601 
Prior to the experiment, each participant’s Corsi block-tapping span and forward digit span were 602 
assessed. The Action planning load condition was identical to Experiment 2. The Motor execution 603 
load condition from Experiment 2 was replaced by a Verbal load condition. Participants heard a 604 
sequence of digits at their individual span prior to observing their partner perform an action and were 605 
asked to reproduce the sequence after their partner completed their action. Concurrent load was only 606 
administered during observations of partner actions, not during execution of own actions. As in 607 
Experiment 2, participants generated 4 exemplars each in response to 15 shape cues split over 3 608 
concurrent load conditions. Participants returned the next day individually for an extended recall task. 609 
They were instructed to retrieve and re-perform either their own actions or those they had observed 610 
their partner perform the previous day. They were told that, as they tried to remember their own (or 611 
their partner’s) actions, other actions may come to mind such as their partner’s actions when they had 612 
to remember their own actions, or entirely new ways of performing each shape. They were 613 
encouraged to perform everything that came to mind as they tried to remember their own (or their 614 
partner’s) actions, and to indicate verbally for each action whether it was a target action or not. They 615 
were not instructed to search their memory for actions from both sources, nor to generate entirely 616 
new actions. 617 
4.1.3 Experimental Design 618 
As in Experiment 1, we manipulated the retrieval task at test in a between-subjects manipulation 619 
(Recall own: N=19; Recall partner: N=19). Additionally, we manipulated the concurrent load during 620 
observation within-subjects (No load, Action planning load, Verbal load for 5 cues each). As in 621 
Experiment 1 and 2, we will focus on contrasting observed source errors with those predicted by 622 
guessing. Since we manipulated concurrent load only during observation of actions, we will focus on 623 
the effects of concurrent load on the false retrieval of observed actions in the Recall own task. 624 
4.2 Results 625 
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4.2.1 Generation phase 626 
Unlike Experiment 2, there was a main effect of Concurrent load on participants repeating their own 627 
actions (No load: M=2.63%, SD=4.15%; Action planning load: M=4.87%, SD=6.09%; Verbal load: 628 
M=5.66%, SD=7.28%), F(2,74)=5.02, MSe=.75, p=.009, ηρ²=.120, with Bonferroni-adjusted 629 
comparisons showing that participants repeated more of their own actions in concurrent load 630 
conditions (Action planning load, p=.033; Verbal load, p=.023) compared to the no load condition. 631 
As in Experiment 2, participants more often copied partner’s actions under load, but this effect was 632 
not significant here (No load: M=8.68%, SD=6.75%; Action planning load: M=10.66%, SD=7.90%; 633 
Verbal load: M=11.05%, SD=7.98), F(2,74)=1.12, MSe=2.45, p=.33, ηρ²=.029. For the analysis of 634 
retrieval performance, only those items that had only been performed by one of the participants in the 635 
pair were included. 636 
4.2.2 Test phase 637 
We will again first report the conventional analyses for the actions participants report at retrieval. 638 
Participants’ responses at retrieval (correct responses, source errors, intrusion errors) were analyzed 639 
as multiple 2 Task (Recall own, Recall partner) x 3 Concurrent load (No load, Action planning 640 
load, Verbal load) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the second factor. 641 
Correct responses were more frequent in the Recall own than Recall partner task, F(1,36)=41.99, 642 
MSe=2.59, p<.001, ηρ²=.538. As in Experiment 2, there was a main effect of Concurrent load, 643 
F(1.707,61.453)=9.02, MSe=3.28, p=.001, ηρ²=.200. Pairwise Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons 644 
showed that while each of the two load conditions led to fewer correct actions being reported than 645 
the control condition (both p=.001), the two load conditions did not differ from one another, p=1. 646 
There was no interaction, F<1. 647 
For source errors, there was no main effect of Task, F(1,36)=1.56, MSe=0.68, p=.22, ηρ²=.041, but 648 
a main effect of Concurrent load, F(2,72)=3.52, MSe=1.37, p=.035, ηρ²=.089, with Bonferroni-649 
adjusted comparisons showing that source errors were more frequent in the Action planning load 650 
than the No load condition (p=.047), with the remaining comparisons not significant, ps>.43. There 651 
was no significant interaction, F<1. 652 
Intrusion errors were more frequent in the Recall partner than Recall own task, F(1,36)=8.39, 653 
MSe=3.64, p=.006, ηρ²=.189. There was no effect of Concurrent load nor was there an interaction, 654 
both Fs<1. 655 
To turn to our measures of interest, we contrasted the rate of source errors observed versus 656 
predicted from guessing as in Experiment 1 and 2. As in Experiment 2, we first compared observed 657 
and predicted source errors in the Recall own and Recall partner task, when all actions were 658 
encoded without a concurrent load (see Figure 5). We analyzed the data with a 2 Task (Recall own, 659 
Recall partner) x 2 Data type (Observed, Predicted) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the 660 
second factor. There was a main effect of Task reflecting that source errors more likely in the 661 
Recall partner than Recall own task, F(1,36)=5.27, MSe=0.54, p=.028, ηρ²=.128. However, there 662 
was no evidence that source errors were observed more frequently than predicted from guessing, 663 
F(1,36)=1.35, MSe=0.49, p=.25,  ηρ²=.036, nor was there an interaction, F<1. Separate analyses 664 
showed that in fact observed frequencies did not significantly surpass predicted frequencies in 665 
either Recall own, t(18)=0.75, p=.23, dav=0.21 or Recall partner task, t(18)=0.89, p=.19, dav=0.31, 666 
both one-tailed. 667 
Source memory for actions 
 
17
We next tested the effect of concurrent load on source errors committed in the Recall own task only, 668 
as shown in Figure 6. We analyzed the data as a 2 Data type (Observed, Predicted) x 3 Concurrent 669 
load (No load, Action planning load, Verbal load) repeated measures ANOVA. Source errors were 670 
committed more frequently than predicted, F(1,18)=10.16, MSe=1.04, p=.005, ηρ²=.361. There was 671 
no evidence for an overall effect of Concurrent load, F(2,36)=2.16, MSe=0.62, p=.13, ηρ²=.107. The 672 
interaction was not significant, F(2,36)=2.05, MSe=0.83, p=.14, ηρ²=.102. 673 
In subsequent step-down analyses, we tested whether observed source errors were greater than 674 
predicted source errors in every concurrent load condition. Observed frequencies significantly 675 
surpassed predicted frequencies in the Action planning load, t(18)=2.61, p=.009, dav=0.82, and 676 
Verbal load condition, t(18)=2.18, p=.021, dav=0.74, but not in the Control condition, t(18)=0.75, 677 
p=.23, dav=0.21, all comparisons one-tailed. 678 
4.3 Discussion 679 
Experiment 3 shows a similar pattern of data to Experiment 1 and 2, in that participants falsely 680 
recalled observed actions as self-performed and self-performed actions as observed to similar 681 
degrees. However, in the no load conditions, in contrast to the previous experiments, source errors 682 
of either kind did not occur more frequently than guessing in the control condition. 683 
In addition, the motor simulation account predicts that performing a visuospatial or motor task 684 
concurrent to observation of actions should decrease source errors compared to observing actions 685 
without a concurrent task (e.g., Lindner et al., 2010; Lindner et al., 2016), or compared to a task 686 
without a visuomotor component, such as the verbal load task used here. Experiment 3 disconfirms 687 
this prediction. Source errors were higher than predicted from guessing for both the motor load and 688 
the verbal load conditions and were, if anything, more frequent in the verbal load condition.  689 
Thus, Experiment 3 provides interesting data for the impact of monitoring processes on source errors 690 
during the recall of action memories. While false retrieval of observed actions as self-performed 691 
exceeded guessing in the concurrent load conditions, the same was not true in the control condition. 692 
In fact, in the control conditions, source errors committed in either retrieval task did not exceed 693 
guessing. This suggests that careful monitoring of the source-appropriateness at recall in the test 694 
phase may be able to reduce the source memory error committed at retrieval under certain 695 
circumstances.  696 
5 General Discussion 697 
5.1 Meta-analysis of the three experiments 698 
The observation inflation effect (Lindner et al., 2010) is the false retrieval of observed actions as 699 
being self-performed and has been attributed to motor simulation due to mirror neuron network 700 
activation during observation. We tested 1) whether we can conceptually replicate the observation 701 
inflation effect with a simpler paradigm that rules out verbal and object-based encoding of the 702 
actions, 2) whether there is a complementary, reverse error during the retrieval of partner’s actions, 703 
and 3) whether motor system loads during observation reduce the observation inflation effect. So far 704 
we have presented results separately for all three experiments. As we pointed out earlier, the 705 
imprecision is high (the power low) in some of the single data points, making conclusive 706 
interpretation of the overall effect difficult. We therefore integrated the data across experiments into 707 
two forest plots (Cumming, 2012) as such a meta-analytic approach should be less affected by noise 708 
than the individual studies. Rather than looking at individual comparisons, we can now look at 709 
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summary effects that contain the effects of the individual comparisons, with more precise effect size 710 
estimates contributing more to the summary effect. 711 
With respect to our first two questions the results are clear. Figure 7 shows the memory error effects 712 
for the control (no load) conditions for all 3 experiments relative to guessing performance at 0. 713 
Summary effect sizes for the Recall own and Recall partner task, given at the bottom of the figure, 714 
reveal two clear effects. First, both observation inflation and the reverse error – reporting own 715 
actions as those of the partner – occur reliably more often than predicted from guessing. Second, the 716 
confidence intervals for the two errors overlap considerably. At present, therefore, there is no 717 
evidence to suggest that one form of error is more frequent than the other. We therefore not only 718 
successfully demonstrated that the observation inflation effect can be replicated in a simpler recall 719 
paradigm that is less vulnerable to effects of verbalization and ambiguous source, but that there is 720 
complementary reverse error. This argues against motor activation views of observation inflation, 721 
according to which to potential for source-confusion should exist specifically for observed actions, 722 
but not self-performed ones. 723 
Our third question was whether a motor system load at encoding would reduce the magnitude of the 724 
observation inflation effect. Motor activation views suggest that occupying the motor system would 725 
undermine the formation of self-related representations of the partner’s actions, and therefore reduce 726 
source errors. We therefore investigated participants’ false recall of their partner’s actions 727 
depending upon whether they were under any motor load at encoding or not. The summary statistics 728 
in Figure 7 support two clear conclusions. First, across experiments, there is a robust observation 729 
inflation effect regardless of concurrent load. Second, the data do not support the predicted 730 
reduction in observation inflation with a motor load: the confidence intervals on the summary 731 
statistics of the control and motor load conditions overlap considerably, with the overall pattern 732 
suggesting a slight increase in errors with motor load, rather than the predicted decrease.  733 
Finally, Figure 8 allows closer comparison of the results in Experiment 3 relative to the prior 734 
experiments. The main difference between Experiment 3 and 2 was the change in retrieval task 735 
instruction that required participants to carefully examine the actions they were reporting. Rather 736 
than examining Experiment 3 in isolation, we can now ask if the change in retrieval task instruction 737 
replicated the effect of Experiment 2. We used a Bayesian approach, employing the Dienes (2008) 738 
protocol and using the Jeffreys (1961) guidelines for interpreting Bayes Factors. The advantage of 739 
the Bayesian approach to data analysis is that it allows specification of an exact expected effect size 740 
based on prior information (in this case, Experiment 2) compared to a null effect (source errors do 741 
not exceed guessing), and provides an estimate of the extent to which the evidence (Experiment 3 742 
data) support either of these two hypotheses. The evidence is judged to be inconclusive if neither 743 
hypothesis is clearly favored due to, for example, a lack of power in the experiment. 744 
We first compared the no load condition in both the Recall own and Recall partner retrieval task 745 
from Experiment 3 to the matching condition in Experiment 2. The prior for the Recall own task 746 
was defined by the effect in Experiment 2 with a half-normal distribution, i.e., one-tailed, with M=0, 747 
SD=1.28. The data was defined by the effect in Experiment 3 with a sample mean of M=.15 and 748 
SE=.20. The prior for the Recall partner task was defined by the effect in Experiment 2 with a half-749 
normal distribution, i.e., one-tailed, with M=0, SD=2.04. The data was defined by the effect in 750 
Experiment 3 with a sample mean of M=.22 and SE=.25. This resulted in Bayes Factors of 0.32 for 751 
the Recall own and 0.29 for the Recall partner task. This means that the data in Experiment 3 752 
provide 3 and 4 times more evidence, respectively, in favor of a null memory error effect than in 753 
favor of a replication of the effect in Experiment 2. This suggests that careful monitoring reduced 754 
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memory errors effect when recalling actions observed without a load. 755 
We next compared the action planning load condition in the Recall own task across the two 756 
experiments. The prior was defined by the effect in Experiment 2 with a half-normal distribution, i.e., 757 
one-tailed, with M=0, SD=.95. The data was defined by the effect in Experiment 3 with a sample 758 
mean of M=.98 and SE=.38. When observed actions were encoded under concurrent action planning 759 
load, the size of the memory error in the Recall own task in Experiment 3 is more compatible with 760 
the size of the effect in the matching condition in Experiment 2 than the null, Bayes Factor=15. This 761 
means that the memory error effect observed in the action planning condition in Experiment 3 is 15 762 
times more compatible with the memory error effect in Experiment 2 than with a null memory error 763 
effect. This suggests that careful monitoring at retrieval can reduce source errors during recall, but 764 
only does so when participants were not engaged in a secondary task during the encoding of actions. 765 
We will return to the theoretical implications of this later. 766 
5.2 Does the observation inflation effect generalize? 767 
The first aim of this series of studies was to test if the observation inflation effect reported by Lindner 768 
et al. (2010) generalizes to a different experimental design, retrieval task and with different action 769 
stimuli. Across three experiments, we have shown a robust effect of observed actions being falsely 770 
retrieved as self-performed actions.  771 
This suggests that the observation inflation effect is not merely an effect of verbalisable action 772 
phrases, but can also occur with non-verbalisable, non-object-directed actions. Additionally, it shows 773 
that the observation inflation effect is not solely a result of the experimental design or retrieval task. 774 
In this series of experiments, we observed robust evidence of observed actions leading to false claims 775 
of self-performance in two versions of a free recall paradigm. 776 
5.3 What is the role of the motor component in source confusion? 777 
Across three experiments, we tested whether motor activation during action observation underlies 778 
false claims of observed actions as self-performed. We failed to find evidence for this account.  779 
First, an account based on internal replicas of observed actions (Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & 780 
Umiltà, 1999; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002) does not explain why self-performed 781 
actions were reported as “observed” in all three experiments, since motor activation during 782 
performance always points towards self-performance, and no conflict between self- and other 783 
performance should arise. Moreover, if mirror neuron activation was fundamentally responsible for 784 
later false memories of self-performance, such false memories should be disrupted when observers’ 785 
motor systems are occupied with a motor task at the time of observation. However, direct 786 
manipulations of the extent to which the observed actions could be mirrored at encoding showed no 787 
evidence for the expected reduction in subsequent source errors, in either Experiment 2 or 3. In 788 
contrast, Lindner et al. (2016) found a reduction in the effect of observation on false and correct 789 
memories of performance when participants performed incongruent actions during observation 790 
relative to when they performed congruent actions (either temporally aligned or shifted), suggesting a 791 
possible disruption of motor simulation. We could not confirm that claim for false memories 792 
specifically when testing concurrent action execution of incongruent actions against both an 793 
observation-only condition and against a non-motor verbal load condition in our paradigm. 794 
Of course, while our manipulations aimed to disrupt basic motor execution and higher level action 795 
planning, it is possible that neither sufficiently reduced motor simulation. However, concurrent motor 796 
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action, with very similar procedures, has been shown to impair perception of observed actions 797 
(Hamilton et al., 2004; Vetter & Wolpert, 2000; Zwickel, Grosjean, & Prinz, 2007) and the 798 
acquisition of motor skills during imitation and observation learning (Bach et al., 2014), and 799 
observation of actions has been shown to influence execution of actions  (Bach & Tipper, 2007; 800 
Kilner, Paulignan & Blakemore, 2003; Press, Cook, & Blakemore, 2011), suggesting a bidirectional 801 
influence between action perception and execution (for reviews, see Avenanti et al., 2013; Campbell 802 
& Cunnington, 2017; Müsseler, 1999; Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007; Zwickel & Prinz, 2012). 803 
Indeed, we found that both low-level and high-level motor system load affected the duplication of a 804 
partner’s actions in the encoding task as well as correct recall of observed actions at test, confirming 805 
that our load manipulation was generally effective. 806 
A second possibility is that we were successful in disrupting the encoding of the motor component of 807 
observed actions but additionally disrupted the encoding of other memory components (e.g. due to 808 
cognitive load induced by the additional task). While the disruption of the encoding of the motor 809 
component is associated with a decrease in source errors, this may have been counteracted by an 810 
increase in source errors due to the overall cognitive load at encoding (Craik, 2014). However, we 811 
would have then expected to see a difference in the number of source errors between the different 812 
concurrent load conditions. Under such an account, source errors in the more cognitively demanding 813 
action planning load task should have been more frequent than in the motor execution task in 814 
Experiment 2 and source errors should have been less frequent in the more motorically taxing action 815 
planning load task than the equally cognitively demanding verbal load in Experiment 3. We found no 816 
evidence for this pattern of effects. 817 
What do our results mean for the observation inflation effect in the observation inflation paradigm by 818 
Lindner et al. (2010)? Our results certainly suggest, as shown by these prior studies, that performing 819 
and observing actions leads to source confusion about actions having been performed or observed. 820 
However, we did not find any evidence for motor encoding of observed actions impacting the 821 
frequency of observed actions falsely remembered as self-performed. Indeed, Lindner et al. (2016) 822 
acknowledge that while motor simulation may occur during observation, additional processes such as 823 
consolidating information from different sources of memory are necessary to account for the inflation 824 
effect.  825 
5.4 Can the source monitoring framework account for the data? 826 
The source monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993) suggests that the source of any given 827 
information is not specifically encoded but inferred from qualitative features encoded alongside the 828 
item information at test. We propose that the source errors observed here and in the observation 829 
inflation paradigm can be accounted for in this framework. In such a view, actions do not have a 830 
special status, but are remembered just like any other event. As such, they are compatible with recent 831 
ideomotor accounts of action and action observation, which argue that actions are learned, stored and 832 
planned on the perceptual level, in terms of the perceptual effects that go along with them (e.g., 833 
Hommel et al., 2001), such as the trajectories they produce or the proprioceptive, visual and auditory 834 
feedback they generate.  835 
A source monitoring account can explain all features of the data in our experiments and has been 836 
previously suggested to account for false memories of self-performance after visualization of actions 837 
(for a discussion, see Henkel & Carbuto, 2008; Lindner & Henkel, 2015; also see Leynes & Kakadia, 838 
2013). Firstly, a source monitoring account can explain why participants not only misremember 839 
observed actions as performed but also performed actions as observed. Performed and observed 840 
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actions both create memories of events that share similarities such as the body parts used, their 841 
trajectories and the manner of performance. These commonalities predict not only source errors in 842 
the recall own task, but a general confusion about the origin of encoded actions that would affect 843 
both tasks equally, and more so if these disambiguating aspects are not encoded. Lindner et al. (2016) 844 
suggest that even if motor simulation occurs, further processes are necessary to result in false claims 845 
of self-performance after observation. It is plausible that evaluation of motor traces in addition to 846 
verbal or cognitive traces is that consolidation process. 847 
Secondly, our results are compatible with the predictions of a source monitoring account by showing 848 
a decrease in source confusion when participants evaluate all qualitative features of individual 849 
memories systematically. Indeed, the retrieval task instructions we used in Experiment 3 did 850 
eliminate source errors. This suggests that allowing participants to withhold remembered items from 851 
report is an effective strategy of decreasing the reports of source errors when retrieving action events 852 
by preventing participants from neglecting to consider the source of recalled memories. This is in line 853 
with effects that showed that source performance can be drastically affected by the instruction and 854 
decision required at test (Dodson & Johnson, 1993; Marsh & Hicks, 1998; Marsh, Landau & Hicks, 855 
1997). Interestingly, finally, that same retrieval task manipulation failed to show the same 856 
elimination of observation inflation when actions had been encoded under concurrent load. Under 857 
source monitoring account predictions, any distraction that prevents the encoding of qualitative 858 
features of items should result in a poorer source memory trace, as fewer source-relevant features 859 
might be encoded. Our data suggest that concurrent load prevented the encoding of source-diagnostic 860 
information for individual actions to such a degree that even systematic consideration of source at 861 
test was unable to overcome that impairment.  862 
There is a possibility that our paradigm may have led to increased source confusion on the basis of 863 
participants visualizing themselves from a third-person perspective (Leynes & Kakadia, 2013). 864 
However, we deem it unlikely that perspective taking would have fundamentally given rise to 865 
magnitude of source confusion we observed. Our instructions explicitly discouraged participants to 866 
imagine their own performance from the other person’s perspective. Given that perspective taking is 867 
cognitively demanding (e.g., Qureshi, Apperly & Samson, 2010; Surtees et al., 2016; Bull, Philips & 868 
Conway, 2008), participants would therefore not spontaneously engage in it, if not motivated by such 869 
task demands.  870 
In conclusion this series of studies demonstrates that while we cannot comment on whether observed 871 
actions are mirrored at encoding, we could not find any evidence for mirroring translating into false 872 
memories of action performance after a delay. Given that a source monitoring account can account 873 
for source confusion of verbal items and action events as well as the variety of patterns in our data, it 874 
is at this stage not apparent what additional explanatory contribution a mirror neuron network 875 
account could make to an understanding of source memory for actions, at least for tasks and actions 876 
such as ours.  877 
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 1146 
Table 1. Full set of mean frequencies of reported responses (SDs in brackets) in Experiment 1 1147 
through 3 for both retrieval tasks and all concurrent load conditions. The maximum number of 1148 
generated items per source and condition are 45 in Experiment 1 and 20 in Experiment 2 and 3. 1149 
  Recall own Recall partner 
  No 
Load 
Action 
Planning 
Load 
Motor 
executio
n load 
Verbal 
load 
No 
Load 
Action 
Planning 
Load 
Motor 
executio
n load 
Verba
l load 
Experiment 1       
Correct 
responses 
23.78 
(3.81) 
- - - 15.94 
(3.99) 
- - - 
Source 
Errors 
8.33 
(3.50) 
- - - 7.65 
(5.30) 
- - - 
Intrusion 
Errors 
6.33 
(2.54) 
- - - 8.29 
(3.14) 
- - - 
Experiment 2        
Correct 
responses 
6.89 
(2.56) 
6.37 
(2.39) 
6.37 
(2.06) 
- 4.72 
(2.24) 
3.50 
(1.29) 
3.78 
(2.53) 
- 
Source 
Errors 
2.63 
(1.54) 
2.26 
(1.37) 
2.58 
(1.84) 
- 3.39 
(2.00) 
2.83 
(1.82) 
3.22 
(1.83) 
- 
Intrusion 
Errors 
2.42 
(1.89) 
2.68 
(1.83) 
2.37 
(1.64) 
- 2.44 
(1.79) 
3.33 
(2.83) 
2.89 
(2.42) 
- 
Experiment 3        
Correct 
responses 
8.21 
(2.04) 
7.21 
(1.39) 
- 7.00 
(2.24) 
5.21 
(2.24) 
3.68 
(2.19) 
- 3.37 
(1.61) 
Source 
Errors 
0.95 
(0.85) 
1.74 
(1.59) 
- 1.37 
(1.12) 
1.37 
(0.83) 
2.00 
(1.60) 
- 1.68 
(1.34) 
Intrusion 
Errors 
1.89 
(1.52) 
1.89 
(1.63) 
- 1.58 
(1.77) 
2.68 
(1.45) 
3.05 
(2.44) 
- 2.74 
(1.56) 
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 1150 
 1151 
Figure 1. Participants perform actions to represent the shape A.  1152 
 1153 
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 1154 
Figure 2. Frequency of observed and predicted source errors in the Recall own and Recall partner 1155 
task in Experiment 1. The error bars are 95% within-subjects confidence intervals. 1156 
 1157 
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 1158 
Figure 3. Frequency of observed and predicted source errors in the Recall own and Recall partner 1159 
task in Experiment 2 for the no concurrent load condition. The error bars are 95% within-subjects 1160 
confidence intervals. 1161 
 1162 
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 1163 
Figure 4. Frequency of observed and predicted source errors in the Recall own task in Experiment 2 1164 
for all concurrent load conditions. The error bars are 95% within-subjects confidence intervals. 1165 
 1166 
 1167 
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Figure 5. 1168 
Frequency of observed and predicted source errors in the Recall own and Recall partner task in 1169 
Experiment 3 for the no concurrent load condition. The error bars are 95% within-subjects 1170 
confidence intervals. 1171 
 1172 
 1173 
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 1174 
Figure 6. Frequency of observed and predicted source errors in the Recall own task in Experiment 3 1175 
for all concurrent load conditions. The error bars are 95% within-subjects confidence intervals.  1176 
 1177 
 1178 
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1179 
Figure 7. Standardized mean change between observed and predicted source errors committed in 1180 
Experiments 1 through 3 in both the Recall own and Recall partner task when action were encoded 1181 
without a concurrent load. Size of the squares represents the weights of the individual comparisons. 1182 
The error bars are 95% confidence interval. The polygons represent the summary effects (fixed 1183 
effects) of the Recall own and the Recall partner task respectively across all 3 experiments. 1184 
 1185 
 1186 
Source memory for actions 
 
37
1187 
Figure 8. Standardized mean change between observed and predicted source errors committed in the 1188 
Recall own task in Experiments 1 through 3 for all concurrent load conditions. Size of the squares 1189 
represents the weights of the individual comparisons. The error bars are 95% confidence interval. 1190 
The polygons represent the summary effects (fixed effects) of the No load conditions and the Motor 1191 
system load conditions (Action planning load and Motor execution load). 1192 
 1193 
